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ABSTRACT 
I examine the costs and benefits to the issuer of hiring an IPO auditor specialist in the U.S. 
Initial Public Offerings market. I quantify IPO auditor expertise at the market share level and the 
market concentration level and then I investigate the audit fees of IPO audit expertise and the issuer 
underpricing in the U.S. IPO market. I find that there are significant fee premiums when an audit 
firm is a national IPO audit specialist and when an audit office is a city IPO audit specialist. I also 
find that IPO specialist auditors reduce first-day issuer underpricing. These results are robust to 
controlling for extant endogeneity with respect to choice of auditor. This paper contributes to both 
the auditor specialization literature and the IPO literature by investigating IPO audit specialization. 
This study also provides useful information to IPO market participants, such as issuers, investors, 
auditors, and regulators.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
I investigate the IPO expertise of audit firms and audit offices in the U.S. Initial Public 
Offerings (IPO) market when audit firms and audit offices gain experience in the U.S. IPO audit 
market as measured by their IPO market share level and IPO market concentration level. I then 
examine the costs and benefits to the issuer of hiring an IPO auditor specialist. Specifically, I 
investigate whether IPO specialist auditors earn higher fees and whether issuers that use an IPO 
specialist auditor exhibit lower first-day underpricing.  
In the IPO market, the auditor’s role as an information intermediary is of paramount 
importance because a high degree of information asymmetry exists between managers and 
potential investors in the IPO setting (Leland and Pyle 1977). On the one hand, management has 
an incentive to manage financial information to demonstrate stronger financial performance in 
order to increase offering prices (Teoh, Wong, and Rao 1998) . On the other hand, potential 
investors mainly obtain information about the firm from the offering prospectus because there is 
often little publically available information about private entities. As the degree of information 
asymmetry increases, the demand for high quality audits significantly increases because high 
quality audits provide independent assurance of the credibility of accounting information, 
improving resource allocation and contracting efficiency (DeFond and Zhang 2014). 
For auditors, IPO audits are unique engagements which differ drastically from subsequent 
regular audits. Auditors are required to make sure that financial statements are audited for up to 
three years prior to the IPO, issue a comfort letter for underwriters, and aid first time registrants in 
applying rules and interpretations. In addition, firms raising capital in the equity markets for the 
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first time are less likely to have well-developed accounting systems and procedures in place 
necessary to comply with SEC requirements. Thus, through more experience conducting IPO 
audits, IPO specialized auditors should be able to develop a deeper understanding of how to 
successfully conduct IPO audits, and become experts in the unique set of requirements and 
expectations required of private companies transforming into public companies.  
Accordingly, investigating whether IPO specialized auditors earn higher audit fees should 
be of interest to client firms and potential investors because higher audit fees indicate a 
combination of audit effort and expected losses from litigation (Simunic 1980). The Simunic 
(1980) framework suggests that if IPO specialized auditors earn a fee premium, it means that IPO 
specialized auditors exert more effort and/or IPO specialized auditors incorporate expected future 
litigation losses into audit fees.  
To extend Simunic’s framework to IPO specialist fee premiums, I argue that IPO clients 
may value IPO specialized auditor expertise because this expertise should help to mitigate the high 
degree of information asymmetry between issuers and investors in the IPO market. As such, 
auditors’ IPO expertise should help to reduce first-day underpricing which increases IPO proceeds 
to the firm. Given that a successful IPO can yield substantial proceeds for an issuer, IPO issuers 
should be willing to pay higher audit fees to IPO specialist auditors.  
A better understanding of auditor specialization in the IPO market should also be of interest 
to governing bodies including the United States Congress and the Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board (PCAOB). In response to burdensome regulations for the IPO process leading to 
IPO activities being well below historical levels, the United States House of Representatives 
passed the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (JOBS Act) on March 8, 2012 (Dambra, Field, 
and Gustafson 2015). The JOBS Act makes it easier for smaller firms to go public by reducing the 
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regulatory burden of these firms seeking to raise equity capital. For example, emerging growth 
companies (EGCs; firms with less than $1 billion in annual revenues) are exempt under the JOBS 
Act from the requirement of an auditor to attest to the effectiveness of the company's internal 
controls over financial reporting. While this exemption should have the effect of increasing the 
number of small firms that go public, it may also increase the number of risky small firms that go 
public, as well as increase the risk of audit failure because the effectiveness of internal controls is 
a part of an integrated audit.  
As a result of this internal control exemption, auditors will likely have to spend more time 
performing substantive tests. Evidence that IPO specialized auditors earn higher audit fees due to 
increased audit effort, increased risk premium, and/or increased IPO expertise would be consistent 
with internal control exemptions being less of a concern for clients with IPO specialized auditors. 
This will be beneficial information to regulators attempting to set the appropriate level of IPO 
regulatory requirements to promote IPO activities while protecting investors from risky firms 
going public. Additionally, in order to further improve financial reporting quality and protect 
investors in smaller IPO firms, the PCAOB, as an oversight body of auditors, could choose to 
focus more of their attention on clients with non-IPO specialist auditors in the course of their 
inspections. 
As a result of smaller firms having access to the capital markets through reduced regulatory 
burden, smaller audit firms may play a larger future role in the IPO market and choose to specialize 
in this market.1 In the U.S. IPO market, there is an increasing trend in the percentage of IPOs 
                                                          
1 Prior literature suggests smaller auditors are increasing their services in a variety of ways. Louis 
(2005) provides evidence that Non-Big N firms deliver better M&A advisory services. Boone, 
Khurana, and Raman (2010) document that audit quality is no different between Big N and second 
tier auditors after SOX. Chang, Cheng, and Reichelt (2010) find a relatively more positive market 
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audited by both mid-size and small audit firms (Treasury 2008). Additionally, Marcum LLP, stated 
in response to having conducted the most IPO audits through the first three quarters of 2015 by a 
non-Big 4 auditor that 34 percent of IPOs in 2015 were audited by non-Big 4 firms which 
“highlights the growing notion that a company need not engage a Big 4 firm to complete an IPO” 
(Marcum LLP 2015). This trend indicates that mid-size and small size auditors may also be able 
to become IPO audit specialists by auditing a large number of IPO clients and obtaining experience 
and knowledge of accounting rules specific to IPO audits. As a result of this changing perception 
of non-Big 4 auditors in the IPO market, I argue that it is important to examine audit specialization, 
regardless of auditor size, in the IPO market and the costs and the benefits of IPO specialist 
auditors. 
 I define IPO specialization in terms of the audit firm and the audit offices’ IPO market 
share level (definition 1) based on audit fees following the framework in Francis, Reichelt, and 
Wang (2005). I also use IPO market concentration levels (definition 2) based on the proportion of 
IPO audit fees over total audit fees following the framework in Gramling and Stone (2001). I then 
examine the association between audit fees and auditor IPO specialization to investigate whether 
IPO specialist auditors differentiate themselves from other auditors and earn a fee premium. I also 
examine whether the use of an IPO audit specialist leads to lower levels of first-day issuer 
underpricing. To address the endogeneity issue in client’s choice of an auditor, I use the propensity 
score matching method in addition to my multivariate analysis. 
                                                          
reaction to clients switching from a Big4 to a smaller third tier auditor after SOX. Bills and 
Stephens (2016) argue that small audit firms play a significant role in audit competition because 
the market share distance from small audit firm competitors has a greater effect on the Big 4's audit 
fees than distances from other Big 4 competitors. 
5 
 
I find that Ernst & Young LLP is the national IPO specialist for eight out of 14 years and 
that Big 4 audit offices are 93% of the city IPO specialists when using IPO market share level 
based measure on audit fees. In contrast, when I use IPO market concentration level based on the 
proportion of IPO audit fees over total audit fees, I find that the national IPO specialist audit firms 
for each year are mostly non-Big 4 audit firms and that Big 4 audit offices are 87% of the city IPO 
specialists. 
 I find a significant fee premium of 78% with national IPO specialist audit firms and 141% 
with city IPO specialist audit offices using the IPO market share level measure. There is an even 
higher fee premium of 272% with national IPO specialist audit firms and of 173% with city IPO 
specialist audit offices using the IPO market concentration level.2 I also find evidence that the use 
of an IPO specialist auditor is associated with lower subsequent first-day issuer underpricing; the 
coefficients on IPO specialist auditor are negative and significant and result in, on average, reduced 
underpricing worth $5.3 million (national IPO specialists definition 1), $3.8 million (city IPO 
specialists definition 1), $6.2 million (national IPO specialists definition 2), and $6.7 million (city 
IPO specialists definition 2). These results are robust to the propensity score matching method.  
Thus, my results suggest that while there are costs to an issuer that engages an IPO 
specialist auditor (higher audit fees), there are also benefits to the issuer (lower subsequent first-
                                                          
2 Using my first measure of specialization, this fee premium at the national IPO specialist level 
equates to, on average, a $477,515 audit fee premium above non-national IPO specialists, while 
for city IPO specialists the fee is $787,623 higher than for non-city IPO specialists. Using my 
second measure of specialization, this fee premium at the national IPO specialist level equates to, 
on average, a $948,537 audit fee premium above non-national IPO specialists, while for city IPO 
specialists the fee is $871,864 higher than for non-city IPO specialists. These fees compare to IPO 
proceeds, which average $173 million in my sample. While these audit fee premiums may seem 
high compared to post-IPO audit fee premium studies, the average audit fees charged in my IPO 
sample are less than 0.5% of proceeds raised, while average underwriter fees are much larger at 
8.79% of proceeds (Griffin, Harris, and Topaloglu 2007) 
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day issuer underpricing). In other words, national IPO specialists (definition 1) earn, on average, 
a $477,515 audit fee premium while reducing underpricing by $5.3 million. City IPO specialists 
(definition 1) earn, on average, a $787,623 audit fee premium while reducing underpricing by $3.8 
million. National IPO specialists (definition 2) earn, on average, a $948,537 audit fee premium 
while reducing underpricing by $6.2 million. City IPO specialists (definition 2) earn, on average, 
an $871,864 audit fee premium while reducing underpricing by $6.7 million.    
My study contributes to both the auditor specialization literature and the IPO audit 
literature. First, while a vast stream of literature exists on auditor specialization, these studies 
mainly focus on industry wide auditor specialization (Bills, Jeter, and Stein 2015; Fung and 
Krishnan 2012; Cahan, Jeter, and Naiker 2011; Reichelt and Wang 2010; Carson and Fargher 
2007; Francis et al. 2005; Casterella, Francis, Lewis, and Walker 2004). Additionally, Mayhew 
and Wilkins (2003) use IPO clients’ audit fees to examine industry specialization and find that 
industry specialist audit firms earn fee premiums. While the setting for their study is IPO clients, 
they only investigate industry specialist auditors and do not investigate IPO specialist auditors. My 
investigation on auditor specialization in the IPO market contributes to the auditor specialization 
literature by focusing on a unique, highly complex audit engagement not yet examined in the 
auditor specialization literature.  
Second, prior IPO audit literature focuses either on only Big 4 audit firms for IPO audits 
(Hogan 1997) or on the effect of additional auditor legal liability under the 1933 Securities Act 
(1933 Act) on audit quality (Venkataraman, Weber, and Willenborg 2008). My study provides 
evidence on whether audit firms and audit offices, regardless of size, specialize in IPO audits. My 
analysis helps better understand differences of audit fees in the IPO market between IPO 
specialized audit firms and offices, and non-specialized audit firms and offices. My paper also 
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extends our understanding of how legal liability under the 1933 Act affects auditors as I 
demonstrate that within this increased legal liability regime, IPO audit specialization occurs, 
affecting audit pricing and reducing underpricing.  
A better understanding of audit pricing in the IPO market should also provide audit firms 
with practical information for when they develop business strategies to differentiate themselves 
from other audit firms and offices in the course of becoming an IPO specialist auditor. In particular, 
my study provides evidence that smaller auditors identified by market concentration levels can 
also earn a fee premium in the IPO audit market. This study also provides useful information to 
IPO market participants, such as issuers and investors, as the results demonstrate that certain 
auditors specialize in the IPO audit market and that these specialized auditors reduce underpricing. 
Private companies considering an IPO will likely benefit from knowing the costs and benefits of 
hiring a particular auditor, and which of these auditors differentiate themselves within the IPO 
market.  
The rest of my paper is organized as follows. Section two provides the background and 
hypotheses development. Section three describes my sample and data. Section four presents 
research methodology. Section five discusses results. Section six provides additional analysis. The 
last section concludes my paper. 
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CHAPTER 2 
BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
BACKGROUND 
 
Auditor liability under the Securities Act of 1933. 
 
The role of auditors as an information intermediary in the IPO setting is critical in reducing 
information asymmetry between issuers of the security and potential investors (Weber and 
Willenborg 2003). As such, regulators impose higher litigation risk to auditors in order to protect 
capital providers investing in initial public offerings. The increased litigation risk to the auditor in 
the IPO process is a result of additional liability that the Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act) imposes 
on auditors when auditing financial statements of IPO firms (Venkataraman et al. 2008). The 1933 
Act was enacted by the United States Congress for the primary purpose of increasing disclosure to 
prospective investors and was drafted as a “Truth in Securities Act” which emphasized “public 
disclosure of material information as the primary mechanism for federal regulation of the securities 
markets” (Ruder 1988). 
Venkataraman et al. (2008) detail differences between the 1933 Act and the 1934 Securities 
Exchange Act (1934 Act) with respect to the auditor’s litigation risk. For example, in accordance 
with the 1933 Act, firms going public must provide a registration statement which includes a 
detailed prospectus and audited financial statements for up to three years of financial statements. 
The auditor is also required to issue a “comfort letter” to the underwriter which provides assurance 
concerning the information in the registration statement that the auditor’s report does not cover 
and for subsequent events after the audit report date (Venkataraman et al. 2008).  
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Legal exposure to the auditor is also higher under the 1933 Act because the auditor is 
required to demonstrate that they exercised due diligence as opposed to the lower threshold of 
good faith for post-IPO audits which are conducted in accordance with the 1934 Act. In other 
words, in the course of litigation brought under the 1933 Act, the auditor is liable for ordinary 
negligence. Investors, as plaintiffs, can sue auditors without proving their reliance on the financial 
statements. In contrast, litigants must demonstrate that the auditor demonstrated grossly negligent 
behavior when bringing suit under the 1934 Act. 
Venkataraman et al. (2008) exploit the heightened level of legal liability imposed to 
auditors in the IPO setting by investigating the relation between auditor exposure to legal liability 
and audit quality. They conclude that audit quality is higher for IPO audits based on their finding 
that audit fees for IPO audits are higher and signed discretionary accruals are more negative in the 
IPO period. They argue that higher IPO audit fees compensate auditors for litigation risk and long 
audit hours required for IPO audits. They also posit that the increased threat of litigation to the 
auditor in the IPO audit leads the auditor to cede less discretion to managers.  
However, another line of prior studies argues that management’s incentive to report strong 
performance in financial statements leading up to the IPO to increase offering price outweighs the 
auditor’s demand for conservatism. Friedlan (1994) provides evidence that IPO issuers make 
income increasing discretionary accruals in their financial statements because reporting strong 
financial performance leads to a better IPO offering price. Friedlan (1994) points out that the 
limited sources of publicly available information leading up to the IPO (compared to seasoned 
equity offerings) allows management higher discretion in reporting earnings.  
Teoh et al. (1998) argue along similar lines that the incentive to manage earnings is strong 
when the firm is planning to sell shares in the market as an IPO because reporting better financial 
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performance may lead to a higher offering price. Furthermore, the opportunity to manage earnings 
also exists because of the high degree of information asymmetry present in the IPO market. Efendi, 
Srivastava, and Swanson (2007) find that among firms that raised new equity capital, those that 
subsequently restate their financials raised more new equity capital than firms without a 
restatement. They argue that a firm’s ability to raise equity capital and the cost of new capital is 
largely dependent on the firms’ financial performance (i.e. accounting numbers). Managers are 
incentivized to report strong financial performance to increase offer price, but if they report 
aggressively, they take a risk of a subsequent financial restatement (Efendi et al. 2007).  
The unique nature of the IPO setting, a combination of managerial incentives for aggressive 
financial reporting and the auditor’s opposite incentives to constrain this behavior gives rise to 
several questions. How do managers of IPO firms choose an auditor? Do certain audit firms (and/or 
offices) specialize in the audit of IPO firms? If so, how are IPO specialized auditors priced? And, 
if IPO specialized auditors earn fee premiums, do they provide a benefit to issuers in the way of 
reducing first-day underpricing? Providing evidence as to whether auditors differentiate 
themselves from other auditors in the audit of IPO firms should be of great interest to audit firms, 
issuers, investors, and regulators.  
IPO specialists 
 
A wealth of research has focused on auditor industry specialization within the audit market. 
However, prior literature on the subject of auditor industry specialization typically considers the 
audit market as a whole (Casterella et al. 2004; Mayhew and Wilkins 2003; Dunn and Mayhew 
2004; Low 2004; Huang et al. 2007; Kwon et al. 2007; Cenker and Nagy 2008; Li et al. 2010; 
Reichelt and Wang 2010; Fung et al. 2012; Ferguson et al. 2014; Cairney and Stewart 2015; Bills 
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et al. 2015; Balsam et al. 2003). What prior research on industry specialization has not done is 
distinguish between first time public registrants and existing public registrants.  
Prior research tends to agree that positive network synergies are created as a result of 
industry expertise in both national audit firms and local offices of audit firms (Bental and Spiegel 
1995; Katz and Shapiro 1985). At the firm-wide level, audit firms gain industry expertise by 
sharing industry focused knowledge and experience, such as the usage of standardized industry-
tailored audit programs, internal benchmarking of best practices, and the exchange of industry 
specialized personnel among different offices within an audit firm (Reichelt and Wang 2010).  
At the office level, auditors obtain “deep personal knowledge of clients” and local business 
conditions that cannot be easily transferable and distributable to other offices (Reichelt and Wang 
2010). Auditor’s individual knowledge at the local office level plays an essential role in 
determining audit quality because audit firms are formed “with partnerships where key audit 
decisions are made at local offices” (Reichelt and Wang 2010). For example, auditors contract 
with clients, administer audit engagements, and issue audit reports signed on the letterhead of the 
local office of the audit firm (Francis, Stokes, and Anderson 1999).  
I extend prior literature on the subject of auditor specialization by examining auditor 
specialization for first time public issuers. I expect that through more experience with IPO audits, 
IPO specialized auditors should be able to gain a deep knowledge of complex legal and technical 
requirements for first time filings, and become experts in the idiosyncratic set of requirements and 
expectations that private companies transforming into public companies must comply with.  
An IPO audit is different from a post-IPO audit for several reasons. First, IPO auditors are 
required to certify that IPO clients have audited financial statements for up to three years prior to 
12 
 
the IPO.3 If the current auditor at the time of the IPO has not audited the prior year financials, the 
auditor therefore may be responsible for auditing up to three years of financials in one year. I argue 
that auditing a private company’s financials for multiple years is different from auditing one year 
of a public companies financial information, leading IPO auditors to develop special skills and to 
gain unique experience in order to provide reasonable assurance for this unique engagement. 
Additionally, IPO auditors should develop specialized knowledge about how to aid in 
applying rules and interpretations for first time registrants including Rule 3-05 of regulation S-X, 
Financial Statements of Businesses Acquired or to be Acquired, Accounting Standards 
Codification (ASC) 718, Compensation-Stock Compensation, and SAB Topic 14, Share-Based 
Payment, ASC 480-10-S99, Classification and Measurement of Redeemable Securities. In 
addition, IPO auditors should be better able to help applying complicated provisions of the JOBS 
Act to their clients. Those rules can change the required number of years of audited financial 
statements according to the significance of clients.4 
Furthermore, IPO auditors are required to issue a comfort letter for underwriters and other 
requesting parties in connection with the registration statement and financial statement schedules 
contained in registration statements filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission under the 
                                                          
3 “Registrants must present the summarized balance sheet information for the most recent two 
fiscal years and the summarized income statement information for the most recent three years, 
unless the entity qualifies as a smaller reporting company or as an EGC in the IPO, in which case 
summarized income statement information is only required for the most recent two years” (Ernst 
&Young LLP 2015). 
4 An example from EY (2015): “a calendar-year company initially files an IPO registration 
statement on 1 April 2015. Registrant acquired Company A, a non-accelerated filer, on 1 August 
2014. Company A has a calendar year end. Registrant meets the conditions and applies SAB Topic 
1.J, which results in Company A being significant at the 25% level using 2014 pro forma financial 
information. Under the regular significance test based on 2013 financial information, Company A 
was significant at the 35% level. This registrant must provide a combination of pre-acquisition and 
post-acquisition periods that result in a continuous audited period of at least 21 months”. 
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1933 Act.5 IPO auditors are requested to provide assurance regarding information in the 
registration statement that the auditor’s report does not cover and for subsequent events following 
the audit report date (Venkataraman et al. 2008). In many cases, IPO auditors are also required to 
issue consent multiple times for revisions to the S-1 filing because the SEC occasionally issues 
comments back to IPO clients leading to revisions to the S-1. IPO auditors thus have to issue 
consent, and likely under time pressure because the markets for IPO are extremely time-sensitive.6 
All of these requirements unique to IPO audits should lead to the development of IPO audit 
expertise. 
Furthermore, prior IPO audit experience of the auditor should signal to managers and 
investors that the auditor possesses an expertise with the distinct SEC filing requirements for IPO 
firms. This expertise should provide the auditor with the ability to skillfully lead the IPO firm 
through the complex filing requirements. I expect that clients value auditors with experience in the 
audit of IPO firms, leading to IPO specialist auditors garnering even more IPO audit engagements. 
Such a phenomenon should lead to some auditors developing IPO specialization.  
At the firm level, audit firms may develop IPO expertise by sharing IPO focused 
knowledge and experience. For example, audit firms may develop standardized IPO audit 
                                                          
5 A comfort letter typically includes “a statement as to the accountants’ independence from the 
issuer, the compliance of the issuer’s audited financial statements with applicable SEC 
requirements, statements regarding the accountants’ review of interim unaudited financial 
statements, negative assurance statements relating to the unaudited comparative stub period 
financial statements included in the registration statement, recital of any changes in selected key 
line items during the period after the date of the lasts financial statements in the registration 
statement, and comments on the results of additional procedures performed on the miscellaneous 
financial information in the registration statement.”(Morrison & Foerster LLP 2016) 
6 For example, Facebook, Inc revised the S-1 filing eight times from February 8, 2012 to May 16, 
2012. Groupon, Inc revised the S-1 filing eight times from July 14, 2011 to November 02, 2011. 
Linkedin Corp revised the S-1 filing eight times from March 11, 2011 to November 16, 2011. 
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programs and then utilize IPO specialized personnel whom are exchanged among different 
offices.7 At the office level, audit offices may gain more experience than other offices if the 
locations of offices are in an area where more young, start-up and growth companies incorporate 
their business. This deep personal knowledge of IPO audits developed in the audit office may not 
be readily transferable and distributable to other offices in the audit firm. Therefore, IPO audit 
expertise may develop both at the audit firm level and at the audit office level. 
Many audit firms, both Big4 and non-Big 4, advertise their IPO services on their websites. 
Table 1 provides a summary of how annually inspected audit firms from the PCAOB discuss their 
role in IPO audits on their websites.8 Among Big4 audit firms, Ernst & Young LLP and PWC LLP 
provide more detailed information about their IPO services through annual and quarterly 
publications. In contrast, KPMG LLP does not have any publication about IPO service.  
Among non-Big 4 firms, BDO USA, Crowe Horwath, and RSM US discuss IPO audit 
service. Other annually inspected non-Big 4 audit firms do not have any IPO services discussed in 
their website. Based on the variation of the claims made by audit firms on their website, I expect 
certain audit firms regardless of their size (Big 4 firms versus non-Big 4 firms) to gain expertise 
within the IPO audit market and to specialize in IPO audits.  
                                                          
7 BDO Seidman LLP on its website states “BDO’s flat structure and partner-led service model 
ensures that you have access to senior-level professionals throughout the process. Unlike many 
other large firms, our national SEC office is part of the engagement team, and is heavily involved 
in the planning stages of your IPO and can help you understand the nuances of registration and 
reporting process.” (BDO USA LLP 2016b). An interview with a PriceWaterhouseCoopers 
director by a member of dissertation committee, Dr. Kenneth Reichelt, at Chicago, IL on August 
7th 2015 further supports this argument. This director stated that they bring in IPO specialized 
personnel with extensive experience in IPO audits from different offices for complex IPO audits. 
8 Audit firms providing audit reports for more than 100 public registrants are annually inspected 
by the PCAOB, while audit firms providing audit reports for less than 100 public registrants are 
triennially inspected by the PCAOB. 
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HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
IPO expertise and audit fees 
 
A large number of studies document a positive association between audit fees and auditor 
industry specialization (Craswell et al. 1995; Ferguson et al. 2003; Francis et al. 2005; Mayhew 
and Wilkins 2003; Numan and Willekens 2012). Craswell et al. (1995) find evidence of an 
industry-specific premium which is distinct from the Big 8 general brand name premium. They 
quantify the industry specialist Big 8 premium over non-specialist Big 8 auditors as being 
approximately 34%. Bae, Choi, and Rho (2016) provides an alternative explanation for the higher 
audit fee premium for industry specialists with evidence that industry specialists expend 
significantly greater audit hours than non-industry specialists. They argue that the greater audit 
hours associated with industry specialization may suggest higher audit quality or may simply 
indicate additional audit work performed by relatively cheaper junior auditors.  
Auditor reputation at both the national level and office level is priced by the audit market 
and leads to the expertise of the auditor being recognized by clients (Francis et al. 2005). Francis 
et al. (2005) document that there is a significant fee premium of 19 percent if auditors are both 
national-level and city-level industry leaders. There is a fee premium of eight percent if auditors 
are city-level industry leaders alone. They find no evidence of a premium for auditors who are 
national industry leaders alone. This finding suggests that an auditor's reputation for industry 
expertise is priced when the auditor is both the national industry leader and the city-specific 
industry leader. This result can be interpreted as evidence that industry expertise transfers across 
offices because national industry leadership affects the audit fee premium.  
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However, there is another line of studies discussing auditor fees, industry specialization 
and economics of scale (Cahan et al. 2011; Fung et al. 2012). Cahan et al. (2011) find that audit 
fees and audit quality are higher (lower) when the specialist audits a lower (higher) proportion of 
clients in an industry. They argue that specialists auditing a smaller proportion of clients in an 
industry are likely to charge fee premiums to recover their investments and provide high quality 
audits to differentiate themselves as project specialists. In contrast, specialists auditing a larger 
proportion of clients in an industry are likely to develop economies of scale which reduces costs 
but also leads to lower quality audits.  
Fung et al. (2012) document that industry specialist auditors earn 14.8 percent fee 
premiums but an economy of scale discount of 1.7 percent for a one-decile increase in percentile 
rankings of the number of audit clients at the city-industry level. More recent research finds that 
industry specialists charge lower audit fees in industries with homogenous operations and in 
industries with both homogenous operations and complex accounting practices without sacrificing 
audit quality (Bills et al. 2015). Further analysis shows that industry specialists charge significantly 
lower fees in homogenous as well as both homogenous and complex industries only when the 
client’s bargaining power is relatively high.  
Based on the findings from prior studies about audit fee premiums, I posit that IPO 
specialists will exhibit audit fee premiums that outweigh fee discounts due to economies of scale 
because IPO clients do not have homogenous operations and the number of IPO clients is smaller 
than the number of clients in the post-IPO audit market. Therefore, economies of scale arising 
from homogenous operations and audit investment cost being spread over a large client base will 
be relatively small for the IPO market. 
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Furthermore, in the IPO setting, Hogan (1997) argues that IPO firms will choose a higher 
quality auditor if the benefit of hiring a higher quality auditor outweighs the cost. She uses audit 
fees as the cost of hiring a higher quality auditor and lower underpricing as the benefit of hiring a 
higher quality auditor. Chang, Gygax, Oon, and Zhang (2008) finds that Big4 auditors earn 
significantly higher fees than non-Big4 auditors in the Australian IPO market. This result suggests 
that clients are willing to pay Big4 auditors higher fees because they expect these auditors to 
deliver higher audit quality. If IPO specialist auditors are able to provide higher quality audits to 
IPO firms, differentiated from other auditors, then I expect these auditors to also receive higher 
fees from their clients. These arguments lead to my first hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1:  IPO clients with an IPO specialist auditor pay higher audit fees compared to clients 
with non-IPO specialists. 
IPO expertise and first-day underpricing 
 
Issuer underpricing occurs when the offer price of IPO shares is lower than the closing 
price of the shares on the first day of the IPO. It is well documented that significant underpricing 
occurs in the IPO market.9 One explanation for issuer underpricing is because of the high level of 
information asymmetry which exists between insiders and investors. Weber and Willenborg 
(2003) argue that the problems which arise due to information asymmetry in the capital markets 
are most severe in the IPO of equity due to “the absence of a track record to aid in security 
valuation” (Weber and Willenborg 2003). Relative to issuers of the security, potential investors in 
the IPO setting possess significantly inferior knowledge about the firm’s prospects and future cash 
flows (Carter and Manaster 1990; Leland and Pyle 1977; Ross 1977).  
                                                          
9 Li, Lin, and Robinson (2016) document underpricing over the years 1987-2010 of 20.66%. 
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While issuers of the firm have access to extensive knowledge regarding the firm’s 
economic potential and the internal operation (Leland and Pyle 1977), the amount of information 
potential investors have about IPO firms is often limited because there are only a few sources of 
publicly available information for private firms. Moreover, the current owners of the firm have 
incentives to opportunistically misrepresent the performance of the firm to potential investors 
(Downes and Heinkel 1982). This incentive, combined with the high degree of information 
asymmetry in the IPO market further increases the possibility of opportunistic behavior by sellers 
of the security (Cohen and Dean 2005).  
Furthermore, unlike informed investors, uninformed investors are often unable to 
distinguish between “good” IPO issues and “bad” IPO issues, which can lead to the uninformed 
investors performing poorly and ultimately deciding not to participate in the IPO market (Rock 
1986). Informed investors are discussed in Ritter (1984) as incurring a cost to determine the firm’s 
true value. If the cost is too high, investors will remain uninformed. Despite being uninformed, 
these investors can still be encouraged to continue participating in the IPO market (at the expense 
of the firm) despite their informational disadvantage if the IPO is priced low by the underwriters 
(Rock 1986).  
Accounting information plays an important role in mitigating information asymmetry in 
market-based economies by allowing investors to better evaluate the return potential of investment 
opportunities (Beyer, Cohen, Lys, and Walther 2010). However, potential investors may choose 
to ignore or place less weight on information released by IPO firms because of the combination of 
the issuers’ incentive (to achieve a high offer price) and opportunity (high information asymmetry) 
to misrepresent or omit financial information. These combined information asymmetries and 
agency conflicts increase the demand for credible financial disclosure (Healy and Palepu 2001). 
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The credibility of financial disclosure is enhanced by regulators, standard setters, auditors 
and other capital market intermediaries (Healy and Palepu 2001). In particular, high quality audits 
provide independent assurance of the credibility of accounting information, improving resource 
allocation and contracting efficiency (DeFond and Zhang 2014). Previous studies argue that the 
nature of the IPO market should give rise to a demand for high quality auditors in the IPO market 
to uncover information about firm value to investors (Simunic and Stein 1987; Datar et al. 1991). 
Once private entities decide to go public, they select an auditor to audit the financial information 
contained in the registration statement. Datar, Feltham, and Hughes (1991) argue that the demand 
for a high quality audit increases as the issuing firm specific risk increases because issuers can 
signal firm value by hiring high quality auditors who deliver more precise information about the 
issuers’ firm value. The assurance provided by auditors should help to reduce, to some extent, the 
information asymmetry between issuers of the security and potential investors (Hogan 1997).  
Because of the expertise IPO specialist auditors should possess as a result of their 
experience in previous IPO audits, I expect they will be able to provide higher quality IPO audits 
which then reduce information asymmetry between issuers and investors. As such, I expect issuers 
with IPO specialist auditors to exhibit lower levels of first-day underpricing. 
Hypothesis 2:  IPO clients with an IPO specialist auditor will be associated with lower levels of 
first-day underpricing. 
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CHAPTER 3 
SAMPLE AND DATA 
I use a sample of companies going public from January 1, 2002 to December 31, 2015. I 
use data from SDC, Audit Analytics, COMPUSTAT and CRSP databases. I start my IPO sample 
period from the IPO issue year in 2002, of which the pre-period is 2001, because the Audit 
Analytics database fully includes all auditor information beginning in 2001. I examine the fiscal 
year immediately prior to the IPO issue date. Auditor information, such as auditor names, audit 
offices, audit fees, and total fees are identified using the Audit Analytics opinion database.10 
Financial statement information is obtained from COMPUSTAT. Stock price information is 
obtained from CRSP. 
To create the audit fees sample, I start with 2,695 firm-commitment IPOs on the SDC 
database with valid CUSIPs from January 1, 2002 to December 31, 2015. I drop 206 American 
Depository Receipts (ADRs) IPOs, 423 firms with missing Audit Analytics data, 420 firms with 
missing MSAs, 102 firms with missing COMPUSTAT data, and 318 firms in the finance industry. 
This sample selection criteria yields 1,226 unique IPO firms. For my underpricing tests, I further 
drop 204 firms with missing CRSP data which yields 1,022 unique IPO firms for my underpricing 
                                                          
10 I use audit fee data from Audit Analytics because they provide this data over my sample period 
of January 1, 2002 to December 31, 2015. Audit Analytics states that audit fees “consist in all fees 
necessary to perform the audit or review in accordance with GAAS. This category also may include 
services that generally only the independent accountant reasonably can provide, such as comfort 
letters, statutory audits, attest services, consents and assistance with and review of documents filed 
with the SEC”. To gain a level of assurance about the accuracy of Audit Analytics audit fee data, 
I randomly select 10 IPOs and compare audit fees in the proxy disclosure to audit fees in Audit 
Analytics database. I did not find any difference in audit fees from the proxy to the database. 
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tests. Table 2, Panel A presents details of the sample selection criteria for my audit fees tests and 
my underpricing tests. 
Table 2, Panel B tabulates the distribution of the 1,226 firm-commitment IPOs by issue 
year for the period from 2002 to 2015. This distribution highlights that fewer companies went 
public after the Dot-Com bust (2000-2002). In contrast, there was a large increase in the number 
of companies that went public from 2004 to 2007 followed by a sharp decline in 2008 due to the 
financial crisis. The number of IPO’s then gradually increases from 2008 to 2012. There is also a 
large increase in IPO activity beginning in 2012 after the passage of the JOBS Act on March 8, 
2012. 
Table 2, Panel C presents the industry distribution for my audit fees sample. There are more 
than 23 industries represented in my sample. The three largest industries are: chemicals and allied 
products (23%), business services (21%), and instruments and related products (8%).  
Table 2, Panel D demonstrates the city distribution for my sample. City is defined as a 
Metropolitan Statistical Area following the 2005 U.S. Census Bureau metropolitan statistical areas 
(MSA) definitions. There are 71 MSAs in which IPO auditors are located. The top five MSAs for 
IPO activity are New York-Newark-Jersey City, San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa Clara, Boston-
Cambridge-Newton, Los Angeles-Long Beach-Santa Ana, and San Francisco-Oakland-Hayward. 
These five MSAs compose 45% of my sample, suggesting that 45% of IPO clients hire auditors 
located in these five MSAs. 
Table 3, Panel A shows the definition of IPO specialist auditors and national and city IPO 
specialist auditors by year. I first define IPO specialist auditors as a national (city) IPO specialist 
if the auditor has the largest annual market share in the IPO market at the U.S. national (city) level 
and has more than 10% greater market share than the closest competitor. City is defined as a 
 25 
 
Metropolitan Statistical Area following the 2005 U.S. Census Bureau metropolitan statistical areas 
(MSA) definitions. I also define IPO specialist auditors as a national (city) IPO specialist if the 
auditor has the largest ratio of market share of IPO clients over market share of total clients at the 
U.S. national (city) level, and has more than 10% greater market share than the closest competitor 
for a given fiscal year, and 0 otherwise.11 I use this additional portfolio measure to identify IPO 
specialists in addition to the market share measure to address the concern that the market share 
measure may be more likely to identify specialist auditors if the auditor charges audit fees that are 
systematically higher. 
 
Table 2. Sample Selection Criteria and Sample Characteristics 
Panel A. Sample Selection for audit fees tests and underpricing tests 
Number of firm-commitment IPOs on the SDC database with valid CUSIPs for 2002-2015 2,695  
Less: American Depository Receipts (ADRs) and Units IPOs 206  
Less: Firms with missing Audit Analytics database   423  
Less: Auditors not located in MSAs 420  
Less: Firms with missing Compustat data 102  
Less: Firms in finance industry  318  
Final Sample in audit fees analysis 1,226  
Less: Firms with missing CRSP data 204  
Final Sample in underpricing tests 1,022  
                                                          
11 In the second definition of IPO specialist auditors, I use the ratio of the top five largest auditors 
for a national IPO specialist in order to have enough observations. Compared to the first specialist 
definition using IPO market share level, smaller auditors have a large proportion of IPO clients 
over total clients using the IPO market concentration level, thus their number of clients does not 
lead to enough observations.  
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Panel B: Distribution of IPO firms by year 
Year No. of firms % of sample 
2002 17 1.39 
2003 40 3.26 
2004 117 9.54 
2005 109 8.89 
2006 124 10.11 
2007 127 10.36 
2008 18 1.47 
2009 40 3.26 
2010 67 5.46 
2011 66 5.38 
2012 91 7.42 
2013 125 10.2 
2014 173 14.11 
2015 112 9.14 
Total 1,226 100.00 
Panel C: Distribution of IPO firms by SIC industry (Table 2 Continued) 
SIC Industry Total % of sample 
13 Oil And Gas Extraction 52 4.24 
15 General Building Contractors 9 0.73 
20 Food And Kindred Products 17 1.39 
28 Chemicals And Allied Products 285 23.25 
33 Primary Metal Industries 14 1.14 
35 Industrial Machinery And Equipment 39 3.18 
36 Electronic & Other Electric Equipment 84 6.85 
37 Transportation Equipment 20 1.63 
38 Instruments And Related Products 95 7.75 
44 Water Transportation 12 0.98 
48 Communications 28 2.28 
49 Electric, Gas, And Sanitary Services 28 2.28 
50 Wholesale Trade-Durable Goods 20 1.63 
51 Wholesale Trade-Nondurable Goods 12 0.98 
54 Food Stores 9 0.73 
56 Apparel And Accessory Stores 9 0.73 
58 Eating And Drinking Places 31 2.53 
59 Miscellaneous Retail 19 1.55 
73 Business Services 256 20.88 
78 Motion Pictures 26 2.12 
80 Health Services 9 0.73 
82 Educational Services 24 1.96 
87 Engineering & Management Services 52 4.24 
 Other 128 10.41 
  1,226 100.0 
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Table 3, Panel A-1 presents national IPO specialist auditors by year under my first 
definition of IPO specialization. PWC LLP is the national IPO specialist for eight out of 14 years 
followed by PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP (three out of 14 years) and Deloitte & Touche LLP (two 
out of 14 years). There is no national IPO specialist in 2010 because the auditor with the largest 
market share does not have more than 10% greater market share than the closest competitor. 
Panel D: Distribution of IPO Auditors by Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) (Table 2 
Continued) 
Metropolitan Statistical Areas Total 
% of 
sample 
New York-Newark-Jersey City, NY-NJ-PA 153 12.48 
San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa Clara, CA 142 11.58 
Boston-Cambridge-Newton, MA-NH 110 8.97 
Los Angeles-Long Beach-Santa Ana, CA 78 6.36 
San Francisco-Oakland-Hayward, CA 72 5.87 
Houston-The Woodlands-Sugar Land, TX 51 4.16 
San Diego-Carlsbad, CA 49 4.00 
Chicago-Naperville-Elgin, IL-IN-WI 42 3.43 
Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington, PA-NJ-DE-MD 41 3.34 
Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV 39 3.18 
Dallas-Fort Worth-Arlington, TX 38 3.10 
Denver-Aurora-Lakewood, CO 35 2.85 
Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington, MN-WI 25 2.04 
Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA 19 1.55 
Seattle-Tacoma-Bellevue, WA 18 1.47 
Durham-Chapel Hill, NC 17 1.39 
Austin-Round Rock, TX 16 1.31 
Indianapolis-Carmel-Anderson, IN 15 1.22 
Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL 15 1.22 
Other 52 20.42 
Total 1,226 100.0 
City is defined as a Metropolitan Statistical Area following the 2005 U.S. Census Bureau 
metropolitan statistical areas (MSA) definitions. There are 71 MSAs. The sample is 1,226 
firm-commitment IPOs from January 1, 2002 to December 31, 2015 
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Table 3, Panel A-2 presents city IPO specialist auditors by year under my first definition 
of IPO specialization. There are 10 audit firms identified as audit firms with city IPO specialist 
audit offices. The majority of city IPO specialist auditors are Big 4 auditors because my first 
definition uses market share to define city IPO specialist auditors. City IPO specialists are 
distributed as follows: Ernst & Young LLP is the city IPO specialist in 68 cities over 14 years; 
PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP is the city IPO specialist in 33 cities over 14 years; Deloitte & 
Touche LLP is the city IPO specialist in 23 cities over 14 years; and KPMG is the city IPO 
specialist in 11 cities over 14 years. 
Table 3, Panel A-3 shows the top five national IPO specialists by year under my second 
definition of IPO specialization. Using this measure of IPO specialization results in a greater 
variety of audit firms being designated as IPO specialists. Big 4 audit firms are in the top five of 
national IPO specialists only in years 2001, 2002, 2003 and 2007. For the other ten years, non-Big 
4 audit firms are in the top five of national IPO specialists. This composition is very different from 
the national IPO specialist list using my first definition in Table 3, Panel A-1. 
Table 3, Panel A-4 shows the city IPO specialists by year under my second definition of 
IPO specialization. There are 17 audit firms defined as audit firms with city IPO specialist auditors 
under my second definition. The majority of city IPO specialist auditors are still Big 4 auditors. 
However, an interesting trend emerges in more recent years: smaller audit firms are more often 
identified as a city IPO specialist auditor.  
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CHAPTER 4 
RESEARCH METHOD 
I use the dependent variable LNAFEES, measured as the natural log of a firm’s annual audit 
fees of an IPO audit (the fiscal year immediately prior to the IPO issue date). The test variable 
IPOSPEC is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if an auditor is an IPO specialist auditor, 
and 0 otherwise. To test whether audit fees are positively associated with IPO specialist auditors, 
I regress LNAFEES on IPOSPEC. The regression model combining control variables used by 
Mayhew and Wilkins (2003), Francis et al. (2005), Venkataraman et al. (2008), and Minutti-Meza 
(2013) is as follows: 
𝐿𝑁𝐴𝐹𝐸𝐸𝑆 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐼𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑃𝐸𝐶 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌𝑆𝑃𝐸𝐶 + 𝛽3𝐸𝐺𝐶 + 𝛽4𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝛽5𝐿𝑁𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆
+ 𝛽6𝑆𝐸𝐺𝐵𝑈𝑆 + 𝛽7𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐴𝑅 + 𝛽8𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁 + 𝛽9𝐶𝐴𝑇𝐴 + 𝛽10𝑄𝑈𝐼𝐶𝐾 + 𝛽11𝑅𝑂𝐴
+ 𝛽12𝐿𝐸𝑉 + 𝛽13𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 + 𝛽14𝐼𝐶𝑊 + 𝛽15𝐺𝐶𝑂𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑁 + 𝛽16𝑁𝑂𝑁𝐷𝐸𝐶
+ 𝛽17𝐵𝐼𝐺4 + 𝛽18𝑆𝐸𝐶𝑇𝐼𝐸𝑅 + 𝛽19𝐿𝐼𝑇 + 𝛽20𝐿𝑁𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐷𝑆 + 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝐹𝐸
+ 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌𝐹𝐸 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡, (1), 
 
A significant positive coefficient on IPOSPEC would support my first hypothesis that IPO 
clients with an IPO specialist auditor pay higher audit fees compared to clients with non-IPO 
specialists. INDUSTRYSPEC is 1 if auditors have the largest annual market share in a given 
industry at the U.S. national level (city level) and have more than 10% greater market share than 
the closest competitor, and 0 otherwise.12 Prior studies show a positive association between audit 
fees and auditor industry specialization (Craswell et al. 1995; Ferguson et al. 2003; Francis et al. 
2005; Mayhew and Wilkins 2003; Numan and Willekens 2012). I expect INDUSTRYSPEC to have 
a positive coefficient. 
                                                          
12 To identify industry specialists, I use the entire audit analytics sample, not only IPO sample. 
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EGC is an indicator variable which takes the value one if the client files as an emerging 
growth company whose annual revenues are less than $1 billion, and zero otherwise. The JOBS 
Act, which streamlined the IPO process for EGC should have a negative effect on audit fees. SIZE 
is the natural log of a client’s total assets. LNSALES is the natural log of total sales. Higher fees 
are expected for larger clients (DeAngelo 1981). SEGBUS is the natural log of the number of 
unique business segments. FOREIGN is calculated by foreign income divided by total income. 
This variable is set to zero if there is no income from foreign operations. INVAR is sum of inventory 
and receivables scaled by total assets. SEGBUS, INVAR, and FOREIGN variables are included to 
control for complexity which should increase auditor effort and result in higher audit fees (Francis 
et al. 2005).  
To control for the client’s inherent risk, I include the ratio of current assets to total assets 
(CATA), the ratio of current assets (less inventories) to current liabilities (QUICK), net income 
before extraordinary items divided by lagged total assets (ROA), total long-term debt scaled by 
average total assets (LEV), LOSS, internal control weaknesses (ICW) and GCONCERN. LOSS is 1 
if net income is negative, and otherwise 0. ICW is 1 if the client firm has internal control 
weaknesses in year t-1, and 0 otherwise. GCONCERN is 1 if the auditor gave a going-concern 
opinion to a client in the fiscal year, and 0 otherwise. Variables for the client’s inherent risk are 
expected to have positive coefficients (Ferguson et al. 2003).  
NONDEC is 1 if the client’s fiscal year-end is not December 31st, and 0 otherwise. It is 
expected to have a negative coefficient because fees are usually lower if the client has a year-end 
that is not December 31. BIG4 is 1 if a clients’ auditor is one of the Big 4 auditors, and 0 otherwise 
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(Minutti-Meza 2013).13 SECTIER is 1 if a client’s auditor is either BDO Seidman LLP or Grant 
Thornton LLP, 0 otherwise. Big4 and second tier auditors have a higher reputation which is 
positively associated with audit fees (DeAngelo 1981; Basioudis and Francis 2007). LIT controls 
for high litigation industry. LIT is an indicator variable which takes the value one if the company 
operates in a high litigation industry (SIC codes of 2833–2836, 3570–3577, 3600–3674, 5200–
5961,and 7370–7374), and zero otherwise (Francis et al. 1994). LNPROCEEDS is the natural log 
of IPO client’s proceeds to measure the auditor’s maximum litigation risk exposure for IPOs. LIT 
and LNPROCEEDS are expected to have positive coefficients because audit fees are higher for 
IPOs with higher litigation exposure (Venkataraman et al. 2008). Lastly, year and industry fixed 
effects control for the systematic effects of time period and industry characteristics on audit fees. 
To examine the relation between auditor IPO specialization and IPO underpricing, I utilize 
a multivariate regression model of underpricing used by Li, Lin, and Robinson et al. (2016) as 
follows: 
𝑈𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑅𝑃𝑅𝐼𝐶𝐼𝑁𝐺
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐼𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑃𝐸𝐶 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌𝑆𝑃𝐸𝐶 + 𝛽3𝐵𝐼𝐺4 + 𝛽4𝐸𝐺𝐶 + 𝛽5𝑉𝐶
+ 𝛽6𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐾 + 𝛽7𝑅𝐸𝑉𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑂𝑁 + 𝛽8𝑆𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐴𝐷 + 𝛽9𝑇𝐸𝐶𝐻 + 𝛽10𝑉𝑊𝑇𝑂𝑇
+ 𝛽11𝐼𝑃𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑇 + 𝛽12𝐼𝑃𝑂𝑇𝑂𝑇 + 𝛽13𝐿𝑁𝐴𝐺𝐸 + 𝛽14𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐷𝑆 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡, (2), 
 
where the dependent variable, UNDERPRICING, is defined as first-day closing price minus offer 
price scaled by offer price. The test variable IPOSPEC is an indicator variable that takes a value 
of 1 if an auditor is an IPO specialist auditor, and 0 otherwise. A significant negative coefficient 
on IPOSPEC would support my second hypothesis that IPO clients with an IPO specialist auditor 
have lower underpricing compared to clients with non-IPO specialist auditors. 
                                                          
13 At the beginning of my sample time period (i.e. January 1, 2002), Arthur Andersen still existed 
and the Big 4 at that time was the Big 5. 
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 I include INDUSTRYSPEC and BIG4 variables to control for Big 4 audit firm and industry 
specialist auditor effects on underpricing. High quality auditors are expected to reduce 
underpricing because they mitigate the level of information asymmetry by providing credible 
financial information to the public. However, recent prior literature does not find a significant 
effect of Big 4 audit firms on underpricing (Chang et al. 2008; Li et al. 2016).  
EGC indicates the IPO client files as an emerging growth company. I expect EGC to have 
a positive effect on underpricing because a higher degree of information asymmetry likely exists 
for emerging growth companies due to the decrease in the regulatory requirements imposed by the 
JOBS Act. VC is an indicator variable which equals 1 if the IPO is backed by venture capital, and 
otherwise 0. Gompers (1996) and Lee and Wahal (2004) argue that venture capitalists grandstand 
when taking their investments public. As such, I expect VC to have a positive effect on 
underpricing. 
RANK is the underwriter ranking from Carter and Manaster’s (1990). Li et al. (2016) find 
a positive association between underwriter ranking and underpricing using the time period 1987-
2010. Because my sample covers 2002-2015, I also expect a positive effect on underpricing. 
REVISION is the price change during the IPO book-building process measured by the percentage 
price revision from the midpoint of the initial filing range to the offer price. Hanley (1993) 
document a positive association between the initial return and the price revision during the book 
building process. I expect REVISION to have a positive effect on underpricing. SPREAD is the 
underwriters fee calculated as the total underwriting, management and selling fees as a percentage 
of the amount offered in the IPO. Li et al. (2016) find a positive association between the level of 
underwriter fees and underpricing. I use TECH which identifies firms in the technology industry 
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based on four-digit SIC codes (Cliff and Denis 2004). I expect TECH firms to exhibit higher 
underpricing.  
Lowry (2003) finds that IPO first-day returns are associated with recent past market returns 
and recent IPO activity. I control for the market returns for the two months prior to the IPO 
(VWTOT), calculated as the sum of the value weighted daily market return for the two months 
preceding the IPO. I expect VWTOT to have a positive association with underpricing. To control 
for hot IPO cycles, I use IPORET and IPOTOT. IPORET is the average first-day returns for other 
IPO firms during the two months prior to the specific IPO firm’s month. IPOTOT is the total 
number of IPOs over the two months prior to the specific IPO firm’s month. I expect IPOTOT and 
IPORET to have a positive effect on underpricing.  
I also control for company age (LNAGE) and the issue size (PROCEEDS). Field and 
Karpoff (2002) find a negative relation between firm age and underpricing. PROCEEDS is the log 
of IPO proceeds in millions divided by the Consumer Price Index (CPI) for the issue year. I expect 
PROCEEDS to be negatively associated with underpricing. Following, Li et al. (2016), I use a 
two-way clustering approach in which standard errors are clustered by year and 2-digit industry 
code (Fama-French industry category) to address correlations among standard errors. 
To address endogeneity concerns raised by non-random treatment assignment (Shipman et 
al. 2017), I use the propensity score matching (PSM) method to mitigate a self-selection bias issue 
in my research as a robustness test. Lawrence, Minutti-Meza, and Zhang (2011) use PSM models 
to control for differences in client characteristics between Big 4 clients and non-Big4. Minutti-
Meza (2013) uses PSM methods to match clients of industry specialist and non-industry specialist 
auditors on a number of dimensions.  
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PSM techniques can decrease reliance on functional form misspecification between 
variables on observable characteristics.14 I match clients of an IPO specialist auditor with clients 
of non-IPO specialist auditors in terms of the propensity score estimated from the selection model 
in equation (3) with replacement. Caliper distance is 0.03 following Lawrence et al. (2011). The 
probit regression model for the auditor choice, similar to the ones proposed by Lawrence et al. 
(2011) and Robin and Zhang (2015) combined with variables relevant to the IPO setting, is as 
follows: 
PROBIT[𝐼𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑃𝐸𝐶 = 1]
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁 + 𝛽2𝑅𝑂𝐴𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 + 𝛽3𝑂𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸 + 𝛽4𝑉𝐶 + 𝛽5𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑇𝐼𝐺𝐸
+ 𝛽6𝑆𝐸𝐶𝐺𝐸𝑂 + ∑ 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑆 + 𝜀    (3), 
where IPOSPEC is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if an auditor is an IPO specialist 
auditor, and 0 otherwise. ATURN is the ratio of sales to average total assets. ROALOSS is one if 
ROA is less than zero, and zero otherwise. VC is an indicator variable which equals 1 if the IPO is 
backed by venture capital, and otherwise 0. PRESTIGE is an indicator variable which takes 1 if 
the underwriter for the IPO has a modified Carter Manaster Rank of 9.1 (Carter and Manaster 
1990; Loughran and Ritter 2004; Ertimur et al. 2014) and 0 otherwise. SECGEO is the number of 
geographical segments in a ﬁrm. I include all control variables from my audit fees model and my 
underpricing model for each test. All variables are as defined in Appendix. 
 
 
                                                          
14 Shipman, Swanquist, and Whited (2017) document complications associated with PSM. PSM 
is not appropriate when relevant variables are unobserved and reduces sample size leading to 
diminished power of tests. PSM design can also significantly change sample composition and 
inferences. My study uses both the traditional ordinary least squares regression and the PSM 
method and shows consistent results, which should alleviate concerns which arise from 
weaknesses inherent in these two econometric approaches. 
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CHAPTER 5 
RESULTS 
Table 3, Panel B tabulates descriptive statistics for my audit fee sample. I partition my 
sample between clients with an IPO specialist auditor and clients with non-IPO specialist auditors 
under the two definitions of IPO specialists. I find that the natural log of a firm’s annual audit fees 
with an IPO specialist auditor are significantly higher in means and medians (at 1% significance 
level) except for the means of national level definition 1 and 2, which provides initial evidence to 
suggest that IPO specialist auditors earn higher audit fees.  
Other control variables including INDUSTRYSPEC (city levels definition 1, national levels 
definition 2 and city levels definition 2), EGC (national level definition 2), SIZE (the mean of 
national level definition 1, the mean of city level definition 1, and the mean of city level definition 
2), CATA (national levels definition 1 and city levels definition 1), ICW (national level definition 
1, city level definition 1, and city level definition 2), BIG4, SECTIER, LIT (national level definition 
1, city level definition 1 and national level definition 2), and LNPROCEEDS (all means) differ 
significantly (at 5% significance level) between the two groups which further supports including 
them as control variables in the multivariate analysis.  
I report mean and median amounts for audit fees, total assets, revenues, and IPO proceeds 
in raw amounts, rather than in the natural logarithm, in order to compare to other IPO studies. The 
average of means (medians) audit fees of IPO specialists’ clients are $.875 million ($.519 million), 
while the average of means (medians) audit fees of non-IPO specialists’ clients are $.788 million 
($.473 million) which is comparable to mean of $.612 million (median of $.413 million) in 
Venkatarman et al. (2008) and reasonable considering my study covers the longer and more recent 
sample period (2002-2015) than their study (2000-2002).  
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The average of means (medians) total assets of IPO specialists’ clients are $606 million 
($79 million), while the average of means (medians) total assets of non-IPO specialists’ clients are 
$564 million ($78 million) which is comparable to a mean of $421 million (median of $36 million)  
in Venkatarman et al. (2008).The average of means (medians) revenue of IPO specialists’ clients 
are $538 million ($74 million), while the average of means (medians) revenue of non-IPO 
specialists’ clients are $439 million ($73 million) which is comparable to mean of $346 million 
(median of $22 million)  in Venkatarman et al. (2008). The average of means (medians) proceeds 
of IPO specialists’ clients are $177 million ($94 million), while the average of means (medians) 
proceeds of non-IPO specialists’ clients are $169 million ($93 million) which is similar to 
Venkatarman et al. (2008). 
Table 3, Panel C tabulates descriptive statistics for my underpricing sample. I again 
partition my sample between clients with an IPO specialist auditor and clients with non-IPO 
specialist auditors under the two definitions of IPO specialists. I find that underpricing of clients 
with a national IPO specialist auditor using definition 2 is significantly lower in means using a 
paired t-test, which provides initial evidence to suggest that national IPO specialist auditors reduce 
underpricing.  
Other control variables including INDUSTRYSPEC, BIG4, VC, RANK, and PROCEEDS 
(all means) differ significantly between the two groups, clients with an IPO specialist auditor and 
clients with non-IPO specialist auditors. This result further supports including INDUSTRYSPEC, 
BIG4, VC, RANK, and PROCEEDS as control variables in the multivariate analysis. 
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Table 3. Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A: Definition of IPO Specialists by Auditor and National and City IPO Specialist 
Auditors by Year (Based on the Audit Fees Sample) 
IPO Specialist Definition 1: An auditor is defined as a national (city) IPO specialist if it has the 
largest annual market share in the IPO market at the U.S. national (city) level and has more than 
10% greater market share than the closest competitor. City is defined as the Metropolitan Statistical 
Area following the 2005 U.S. Census Bureau MSA definitions. 
IPO Specialist Definition 2: An auditor is defined as a national (city) IPO specialist if it has the 
largest ratio of market share of IPO clients over market share of total clients at the U.S. national 
(city) level, and has more than 10% greater market share than the closest competitor for a given 
fiscal year, and 0 otherwise. For a national IPO specialist, I use the top five largest ratio auditors 
to have enough observations. 
Panel A-1: National IPO Specialists by Year—Definition 1 
Fiscal Year IPO National Specialists 
2001 PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP 
2002 PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP 
2003 Ernst & Young LLP 
2004 Ernst & Young LLP 
2005 Ernst & Young LLP 
2006 Ernst & Young LLP 
2007 Ernst & Young LLP 
2008 Deloitte & Touche LLP 
2009 Deloitte & Touche LLP 
2010 NA 
2011 PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP 
2012 Ernst & Young LLP 
2013 Ernst & Young LLP 
2014 Ernst & Young LLP 
The fiscal year for IPO specialist auditors starts from 2001 and ends 2014 because my sample 
consist of firms that went public from January 1, 2002 to December 31, 2015 and the majority of 
IPO clients select their auditor a year before they go public. An auditors is defined as a national 
IPO specialist if it has the largest annual market share in IPO market at the U.S. national level and 
has more than 10% greater market share than the closest competitor. The auditor with the largest 
market share in 2010 did not have more than 10% greater market share than the closest competitor
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Table 4, Panel A and Table 4, Panel B presents a Pearson and Spearman correlation matrix 
for my audit fee variables and underpricing variables, respectively. I report the Pearson correlation 
coefficients above the diagonal and Spearman correlation coefficients below the diagonal. Bolded 
coefficients are significant at the five percent level. 
The Pearson correlations between IPO specialists and audit fees are 0.05 (national level 
definition 1), 0.14 (city level definition 1), 0.00 (national level definition 2), and 0.15 (city level 
definition 2), indicating that overall there is no linear correlation between IPO specialists and audit 
fees. The Pearson correlations between IPO specialists and underpricing are -0.01 (national level 
definition 1), 0.01 (city level definition 1),  
-0.07 (national level definition 2), and -0.02 (city level definition 2), indicating that overall there 
is no linear correlation between IPO specialists and underpricing. The Pearson correlations results 
and univariate test results together suggest that multivariate regression tests should be conducted 
to make inferences for my H1 and H2.  
The Pearson correlations between IPO specialists at the U.S. national level and industry 
specialists at the U.S. national level are -0.01 (definition 1) and -0.06 (definition 2), suggesting 
that national IPO specialist are not positively correlated with national industry specialists. The 
Pearson correlations between IPO specialists at the U.S. city level and industry specialists at the 
U.S. city level are 0.20 (definition 1) and 0.11 (definition 2), indicating that there is a weak 
correlation between city IPO specialists and city industry specialists. None of the variance inflation 
factors on any of the variables exceeds five, which is below the threshold of ten recommended by 
Kennedy (1992) to test for multicollinearity.
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Results of my audit fee tests are reported in Table 5. My test variable is IPOSPEC. The 
coefficients on IPOSPEC are positive and statistically significant in all four models (national IPO 
specialist using definition one, city IPO specialist using definition one, national IPO specialist 
using definition two, city IPO specialist using definition two) and are consistent with my 
expectations. These significant positive coefficients on IPOSPEC support my first hypothesis that 
IPO clients with an IPO specialist auditor pay higher audit fees compared to clients with non-IPO 
specialists.  
Using my first measure of specialization, national IPO specialists charge 78% higher audit 
fees than non-national IPO specialists, while city IPO specialists charge 141% higher audit fees 
than non-city IPO specialists. Using my second measure of specialization, national IPO specialists 
charge 272% higher audit fees than non-national IPO specialists, while city IPO specialists charge 
173% higher audit fees than non-city IPO specialists.15 These results demonstrate the economic 
significance of IPO specialists. My adjusted R2s range from 36% to 37% which are comparable to 
previous IPO audit fee studies (adjusted R2s in Venkataraman et al. (2008) range from 31% to 38% 
and the adjusted R2 in Mayhew and Wilkins (2003) is 26%). 
The coefficients on INDUSTRYSPEC, SIZE, LOSS, ICW, and SECTIER  in my city models 
are positive and statistically significant, suggesting that audit fees are higher for firms that are 
audited from an industry city specialist audit office, are larger, reported a net loss, reported internal 
control weaknesses, and/or were audited from second tier audit firms. The coefficients on 
FOREIGN and NONDEC are negative and statistically significant, suggesting that audit fees are 
lower for clients with foreign incomes and/or without a December 31st fiscal year-end. 
                                                          
15 The interpretation of coefficients is the following: %∆ 𝑦 = 100(𝑒𝛽1 − 1) when 𝛽1 ≤ -0.1  and 
𝛽1 ≥ 0.1 (Craswell et al. 1995). 
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Results of my audit fee tests using the propensity score matching (PSM) method tests are 
reported in Table 6. I also evaluate whether covariates are balanced and report these results in 
Table 6. All twenty-five of the covariates (twenty-four covariates for city IPO specialist using 
definition one and national IPO specialist using definition two) are insignificantly different 
between IPO specialist clients and non-IPO specialist clients after matching.16 These results 
suggest that the covariate balance substantially improves in the matched sample.  
The coefficients on IPOSPEC, the test variable, are again positive and statistically 
significant in all four models. These results are consistent with the results from my OLS models. 
These significant positive coefficients on IPOSPEC support my first hypothesis that IPO clients 
with an IPO specialist auditor pay higher audit fees compared to clients with non-IPO specialists 
after controlling for a self-selection bias issue. Economically, using my first measure of 
specialization, national IPO specialists charge 177% higher audit fees than non-national IPO 
specialists, while city IPO specialists charge 86% higher audit fees than non-city IPO specialists. 
Using my second measure of specialization, national IPO specialists charge 755% higher audit 
fees than non-national IPO specialists, while city IPO specialists charge 96% higher audit fees than 
non-city IPO specialists. 
Results from my underpricing tests are reported in Table 7. My test variable is IPOSPEC. 
The coefficients on IPOSPEC are negative and statistically significant in three out of four models 
(city IPO specialist using definition one, national IPO specialist using definition two and city IPO 
specialist using definition two). These results support my second hypothesis that IPO clients with 
an IPO specialist auditor will exhibit lower levels of first-day underpricing.  
                                                          
16 I evaluate covariate balance using the same set of nineteen covariates from equation (1) and 6 
covariates from equation (3). 
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Economically, on average, IPO specialists reduced underpricing worth $3.8 million (city 
IPO specialists definition 1), $6.2 million (national IPO specialists definition 2), and $6.7 million 
(city IPO specialists definition 2).  
The coefficients on EGC, VC, RANK, REVISION, SPREAD, VWTOT and IPOTOT in my 
underpricing models are positive and statistically significant, suggesting that there is higher 
underpricing for firms that are emerging growth companies, are backed by venture capital, hire a 
more prestigious underwriter, have a higher price revision from the book building process, have a 
higher fraction of underwriters’ fees over proceeds, and/or go public during a hot IPO market.  
Results of my underpricing tests using the propensity score matching (PSM) method are 
reported in Table 8. I also evaluate whether covariates are balanced and report these results in 
Table 8. Sixteen covariates out of eighteen covariates are insignificantly different between IPO 
specialist clients and non-IPO specialist clients after matching.17 These results suggest that the 
covariate balance substantially improves in the matched sample. 
The coefficients on IPOSPEC are negative and statistically significant in three out of four 
models (city IPO specialist using definition one, national IPO specialist using definition two and 
city IPO specialist using definition two). These results are consistent with results from my OLS 
models and support my second hypothesis that IPO clients with an IPO specialist auditor will 
exhibit lower levels of first-day underpricing. Economically, on average, IPO specialists reduced 
underpricing worth $6.9 million (city IPO specialists definition 1), $6.6 million (national IPO 
specialists definition 2), and $8.3 million (city IPO specialists definition 2). 
                                                          
17 I evaluate covariate balance using the same set of fourteen covariates from equation (2) and 4 
covariates from equation (3) after eliminating the same covariates in the two equations. 
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CHAPTER 6 
ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS 
I also reclassify my IPO specialist variable using a rolling three year window prior to IPO 
issue date. In my OLS audit fees tests, the coefficients on IPOSPEC, the test variable, are positive 
and statistically significant in three models (0.91 (t=2.94) for national IPO specialists using 
definition 1, 1.40 (t=4.72) for city IPO specialists using definition 1, 0.43 (t=1.03) for national IPO 
specialists using definition 2, and 1.08 (t=3.75) for city IPO specialists using definition 2). In my 
PSM audit fees tests, the coefficients on IPOSPEC, the test variable, are positive and statistically 
significant in all models (0.83 (t=3.10) for national IPO specialists using definition 1, 0.67 (t=2.54) 
for city IPO specialists using definition 1, 2.10 (t=3.17) for national IPO specialists using definition 
2, and 0.87 (t=3.38) for city IPO specialists using definition 2).   
In my underpricing tests, the coefficients on IPOSPEC, the test variable, are negative and 
statistically significant in all models (-0.04 (t=-1.98) for national IPO specialists using definition 
1, -0.02 (t=-1.86) for city IPO specialists using definition 1, -0.03 (t=-1.80) for national IPO 
specialists using definition 2, and -0.02 (t=-1.46) for city IPO specialists using definition 2). In my 
PSM underpricing tests, the coefficients on IPOSPEC, the test variable, are negative and 
statistically significant in three models (-0.05 (t=-1.98) for national IPO specialists using definition 
1, -0.03 (t=-2.03) for city IPO specialists using definition 1, -0.06 (t=-1.95) for national IPO 
specialists using definition 2, and -0.02 (t=-0.81) for city IPO specialists using definition 2). These 
results using a rolling three year window prove additional support that IPO specialist auditors earn 
fee premiums while reducing underpricing.  
In my study, I also seek to better understand whether IPO specialist auditors provide 
higher audit quality. Audit specialists are believed to be better able to deliver higher audit quality 
 58 
because they possess a deeper knowledge of business and accounting practices than non-
specialist auditors, suggesting that specialists have greater competency in providing high quality 
audits (Dopuch and Simunic 1982; Reichelt and Wang 2010). I use restatements and 
discretionary accruals to examine the audit quality of IPO specialist auditors. Results of my 
restatement and discretionary accrual tests show that the coefficients of IPO specialist auditors 
are negative but not statistically significant.  
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION 
In this paper, I examine auditor specialization in the IPO market and then investigate the 
pricing of IPO auditor expertise and the issuer underpricing of IPO auditor expertise. I find that 
IPO clients with an IPO specialist auditor pay higher audit fees compared to clients with non-IPO 
specialists using both the traditional OLS regression and the propensity score matching method. 
When an audit firm is a national IPO audit specialist, I document significant fee premiums of 78 
percent using an IPO market share measure and 272 percent using an IPO market concentration 
measure. Additionally, when an audit office is a city IPO audit specialist, I document significant 
fee premiums of 141 percent using an IPO market share measure and 173 percent using an IPO 
market concentration measure. I also document evidence that IPO clients with an IPO specialist 
auditor are associated with lower levels of first-day underpricing. Specifically, city IPO specialists 
using an IPO market share measure, national IPO specialists using an IPO market concentration 
measure and city IPO specialists using an IPO market concentration measure reduce first-day 
issuer underpricing by 2.1 percent, 3.9 percent and 3.7 percent, respectively. 
Results from my study contribute to both the auditor specialization literature and the IPO 
audit literature by investigating auditor IPO specialization within the IPO audit market. I detail 
that prior auditor specialization literature only focuses on industry wide auditor specialization and 
does not distinguish between pre-IPO audits and post-IPO audits. While prior IPO audit literature
 60 
 demonstrates that Big4 audit firms of IPO issuers earn higher fees and that the increased litigation 
risk imposed on auditors in pre-IPO audits leads to higher audit quality, no study has linked IPO 
auditor specialization and audit fees. In addition, I also contribute to the auditing literature by 
finding that IPO auditor specialization is associated with reduced levels of underpricing. 
Additionally, my study also provides useful information to IPO market participants, such 
as auditors, issuers, regulators, and investors. For auditors, a better understanding of audit pricing 
in the IPO market should provide audit firms with practical information as they develop business 
strategies to differentiate themselves from other audit firms in the course of becoming an IPO 
specialist auditor. For issuers, private companies considering an IPO should benefit from knowing 
the costs and the benefits of hiring IPO specialist auditors and which auditors differentiate 
themselves within the IPO market. Regulators including the PCAOB will be able to use the results 
from my study during their audit firm inspections because my analysis provides evidence of 
auditor specialization within the IPO audit market. Also, I provide evidence that IPO specialized 
auditors exert more effort (higher audit fees) which should help regulators to better understand the 
role auditors (specialists and non-specialists) play in enforcing requirements in the IPO market as 
a result of my study. Lastly, for potential investors, it should be beneficial information to know 
that IPO specialist auditors have some effect on the value of the underlying security. 
 61 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Bae, G. S., S. U. K. Choi, and J. H. W. A. Rho. 2016. Audit Hours and Unit Audit Price of 
Industry Specialist Auditors: Evidence from Korea. Contemporary Accounting Research 
33 (1):314-340. 
Balsam, S., J. Krishnan, and J. S. Yang. 2003. Auditor Industry Specialization and Earnings 
Quality. Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory 22 (2):71-97. 
Basioudis, I. G., and J. R. Francis. 2007. Big 4 Audit Fee Premiums for National and Office-
Level Industry Leadership in the United Kingdom. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & 
Theory 26 (2):143-166. 
BDO USA LLP. 2013. Access to Capital Markets: available at: 
https://www.bdo.com/getattachment/01a93e61-fecf-4421-94ed-
114c8ee71c51/attachment.aspx (viewed January 31, 2017). 
———. 2015a. 2015 Bdo Ipo Halftime Report: available at: 
https://www.bdo.com/getattachment/f1f2cf52-e305-4657-9fef-
1e10870d079c/attachment.aspx (viewed January 31, 2017). 
———. 2015b. 2015 Bdo Ipo Outlook: available at: 
https://www.bdo.com/getattachment/51c54849-a57e-40e4-974c-
ccd8ff7af9fd/attachment.aspx (viewed January 31, 2017). 
———. 2016a. Capital Markets Practice Newsbytes: available at: 
https://www.bdo.com/getattachment/e731d86a-da9e-428c-9c8c-
5e5e5a140426/attachment.aspx?Capital-Markets-Newsbytes-2016-IPO-Halftime-7-
16.pdf (viewed January 31, 2017). 
———. Ipo Services  2016b [cited. Available from 
https://www.bdo.com/services/assurance/public-company-services/ipo-services. 
Bental, B., and M. Spiegel. 1995. Network Competition, Product Quality, and Market Coverage 
in the Presence of Network Externalities. Journal of Industrial Economics 43 (2):197-
208. 
Beyer, A., D. A. Cohen, T. Z. Lys, and B. R. Walther. 2010. The Financial Reporting 
Environment: Review of the Recent Literature. Journal of Accounting & Economics 50 
(2/3):296-343. 
Bills, K. L., D. C. Jeter, and S. E. Stein. 2015. Auditor Industry Specialization and Evidence of 
Cost Efficiencies in Homogenous Industries. The Accounting Review 90 (5):1721-1754. 
Bills, K. L., and N. M. Stephens. 2016. Spatial Competition at the Intersection of the Large and 
Small Audit Firm Markets. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory 35 (1):23-45. 
 62 
 
Boone, J. P., I. K. Khurana, and K. K. Raman. 2010. Do the Big 4 and the Second-Tier Firms 
Provide Audits of Similar Quality? Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 29 (4):330-
352. 
Cahan, S. F., D. C. Jeter, and V. Naiker. 2011. Are All Industry Specialist Auditors the Same? 
Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory 30 (4):191-222. 
Cairney, T. D., and E. G. Stewart. 2015. Audit Fees and Client Industry Homogeneity. Auditing: 
A Journal of Practice & Theory 34 (4):33-57. 
Carson, E., and N. Fargher. 2007. Note on Audit Fee Premiums to Client Size and Industry 
Specialization. Accounting & Finance 47 (3):423-446. 
Carter, R., and S. Manaster. 1990. Initial Public Offerings and Underwriter Reputation. Journal 
of Finance 45 (4):1045-1067. 
Casterella, J. R., J. R. Francis, B. L. Lewis, and P. L. Walker. 2004. Auditor Industry 
Specialization, Client Bargaining Power, and Audit Pricing. Auditing: A Journal of 
Practice & Theory 23 (1):123-140. 
Cenker, W. J., and A. L. Nagy. 2008. Auditor Resignations and Auditor Industry Specialization. 
Accounting Horizons 22 (3):279-295. 
Chang, H., C. S. A. Cheng, and K. J. Reichelt. 2010. Market Reaction to Auditor Switching from 
Big 4 to Third-Tier Small Accounting Firms. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory 
29 (2):83-114. 
Chang, X., A. Gygax, E. Oon, and H. F. Zhang. 2008. Audit Quality, Auditor Compensation and 
Initial Public Offering Underpricing. Accounting & Finance 48 (3):391-416. 
Cliff, M. T., and D. J. Denis. 2004. Do Initial Public Offering Firms Purchase Analyst Coverage 
with Underpricing? Journal of Finance 59 (6):2871-2901. 
Cohen, B. D., and T. J. Dean. 2005. Information Asymmetry and Investor Valuation of IPOs: 
Top Management Team Legitimacy as a Capital Market Signal. Strategic Management 
Journal 91 (7):683-690. 
Craswell, A. T., J. R. Francis, and S. L. Taylor. 1995. Auditor Brand Name Reputations and 
Industry Specializations. Journal of Accounting and Economics 20 (3):297-322. 
Crowe Horwath LLP. 2015. Reaching the Pinnacle - a Guide to Going Public and Living as a 
Public Company: available at: http://www.crowehorwath.net/uploadedFiles/Crowe-
Horwath-Global/publications/pubs/ASR15912-Guide-to-Going-Public-Pinnacle-lo.pdf 
(viewed January 31, 2017). 
Dambra, M., L. C. Field, and M. T. Gustafson. 2015. The Jobs Act and Ipo Volume: Evidence 
That Disclosure Costs Affect the Ipo Decision. Journal of Financial Economics 116 
(1):121-143. 
 63 
 
Datar, S. M., G. A. Feltham, and J. S. Hughes. 1991. The Role of Audits and Audit Quality in 
Valuing New Issues. Journal of Accounting and Economics 14 (1):3-49. 
DeAngelo, L. E. 1981. Auditor Size and Audit Quality. Journal of Accounting and Economics 3 
(3):183-199. 
DeFond, M., and J. Zhang. 2014. A Review of Archival Auditing Research. Journal of 
Accounting and Economics 58 (2–3):275-326. 
Deloitte. 2014. Strategies for Going Public: The Changing Landscape for IPOs. available at 
https://www2.deloitte.com/us/en/pages/risk/articles/strategies-for-going-public-the-
changing-landscape-for-ipos.html: Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu Limited. 
Dopuch, N., and D. A. Simunic. 1982. Competition in Audit Research: An Assessment. . The 4th 
symposium on audit research, University of Illinois. 
Downes, D. H., and R. Heinkel. 1982. Signaling and the Valuation of Unseasoned New Issues. 
Journal of Finance 37 (1):1-10. 
Dunn, K., and B. Mayhew. 2004. Audit Firm Industry Specialization and Client Disclosure 
Quality. Review of Accounting Studies 9 (1):35-58. 
Efendi, J., A. Srivastava, and E. P. Swanson. 2007. Why Do Corporate Managers Misstate 
Financial Statements? The Role of Option Compensation and Other Factors. Journal of 
Financial Economics 85 (3):667-708. 
Ernst and Young LLP. 2013a. Ey's Guide to Going Public: available at: 
http://www.ey.com/gl/en/services/strategic-growth-markets/ey-guide-to-going-public-3-
ipo-execution-phase (viewed January 16, 2017). 
———. 2013b. Ipo Destination Guide: available at: 
http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/EY_-_IPO_destination_guide/$FILE/EY-
IPO-destination-guide.pdf (viewed January 30, 2017). 
———. 2013c. Ipo Readiness: available at: http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/EY-
IPO-readiness/$FILE/EY-IPO-readiness.pdf (viewed January 30, 2017). 
———. 2013d. Life after an Ipo: available at: 
http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/EY_-_Life_after_an_IPO/$FILE/EY-
Essential-guide-Life-after-IPO.pdf (viewed January 30, 2017). 
———. 2013e. Risk Management after an Ipo: available at: 
http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/ey-pdf-risk-management-after-an-
ipo/$FILE/ey-risk-management-after-an-ipo.pdf (viewed January 30, 2017). 
———. 2015a. The Jobs Act: 2015 Mid-Year Update available at: 
http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/JOBSAct_2015MidYear_CC0419_16Septe
 64 
 
mber2015/$FILE/JOBSAct_2015MidYear_CC0419_16September2015.pdf (viewed 
January 30, 2017). 
———. 2015b. Taking It to Heart: available at: 
http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/EY_Taking_it_to_heart/$FILE/ey-taking-it-
to-heart-ir-survey.pdf (viewed January 30, 2017). 
———. 2015c. Technical Line: available at: 
http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/TechnicalLine_CC0423_IPOAccountingan
dDisclosureConsideration_7October2015/$FILE/TechnicalLine_CC0423_IPOAccountin
gandDisclosureConsideration_7October2015.pdf (viewed January 30, 2017). 
———. 2016a. 2016 Global Ipo Trends 1q: available at: 
http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/ey-4q-2016-global-ipo-trends-
report/$FILE/ey-4q-2016-global-ipo-trends-report.pdf (viewed January 30, 2017). 
———. 2016b. Ipo and Strategic Transactions Summit: available at: 
http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/ey-weoy-2016-ipo-summit-
brochure/$FILE/ey-weoy-2016-ipo-summit-brochure.pdf (viewed January 30, 2017). 
Ertimur, Y., E. Sletten, and J. Sunder. 2014. Large Shareholders and Disclosure Strategies: 
Evidence from Ipo Lockup Expirations. Journal of Accounting & Economics 58 (1):79-
95. 
FASB. 2017. Accounting for Redeemable Equity Instruments, Amendment to Section 480-10-
S99. Financial Accounting Standards Board 2009 [cited January 30 2017]. Available 
from 
http://www.fasb.org/cs/BlobServer?blobcol=urldata&blobtable=MungoBlobs&blobkey=i
d&blobwhere=1175819483183&blobheader=application/pdf (viewed January 30, 2017). 
———. 2017. Financial Accounting Standards Codification 718. Financial Accounting 
Standards Board 2014 [cited January 30 2017]. Available from 
https://asc.fasb.org/imageRoot/85/51831185.pdf (viewed January 30, 2017). 
Ferguson, A., J. R. Francis, and D. J. Stokes. 2003. The Effects of Firm-Wide and Office-Level 
Industry Expertise on Audit Pricing. The Accounting Review 78 (2):429-448. 
Ferguson, A., G. Pündrich, and A. Raftery. 2014. Auditor Industry Specialization, Service 
Bundling, and Partner Effects in a Mining-Dominated City. Auditing: A Journal of 
Practice & Theory 33 (3):153-180. 
Field, L. C., and J. M. Karpoff. 2002. Takeover Defenses of Ipo Firms. Journal of Finance 57 
(5):1857-1889. 
Francis, J., D. Philbrick, and K. Schipper. 1994. Shareholder Litigation and Corporate 
Disclosures. Journal of Accounting Research 32 (2):137-164. 
 65 
 
Francis, J. R., K. Reichelt, and D. Wang. 2005. The Pricing of National and City-Specific 
Reputations for Industry Expertise in the U.S. Audit Market. The Accounting Review 80 
(1):113-136. 
Francis, J. R., D. J. Stokes, and D. Anderson. 1999. City Markets as a Unit of Analysis in Audit 
Research and the Re-Examination of Big 6 Market Shares. Abacus 35 (2):185-206. 
Friedlan, J. M. 1994. Accounting Choices of Issuers of Initial Public Offerings. Contemporary 
Accounting Research 11 (1):1-31. 
Fung, S. Y. K., F. A. Gul, and J. Krishnan. 2012. City-Level Auditor Industry Specialization, 
Economies of Scale, and Audit Pricing. The Accounting Review 87 (4):1281-1307. 
Gompers, P. A. 1996. Grandstanding in the Venture Capital Industry. Journal of Financial 
Economics 42 (1):133-156. 
Gramling, A. A., and D. N. Stone. 2001. Audit Firm Industry Expertise:  A Review and 
Synthesis of the Archival Literature. Journal of Accounting Literature 20:1-29. 
Griffin, J. M., J. H. Harris, and S. Topaloglu. 2007. Why Are Ipo Investors Net Buyers through 
Lead Underwriters? Journal of Financial Economics 85 (2):518-551. 
Hanley, K. W. 1993. The Underpricing of Initial Public Offerings and the Partial Adjustment 
Phenomenon. Journal of Financial Economics 34 (2):231-250. 
Healy, P. M., and K. G. Palepu. 2001. Information Asymmetry, Corporate Disclosure, and the 
Capital Markets: A Review of the Empirical Disclosure Literature. Journal of Accounting 
and Economics 31 (1-3):405-440. 
Hogan, C. E. 1997. Costs and Benefits of Audit Quality in the Ipo Market: A Self-Selection 
Analysis. Accounting Review 72 (1):67. 
Huang, H.-W., L.-L. Liu, K. Raghunandan, and D. V. Rama. 2007. Auditor Industry 
Specialization, Client Bargaining Power, and Audit Fees: Further Evidence. Auditing: A 
Journal of Practice & Theory 26 (1):147-158. 
Katz, M. L., and C. Shapiro. 1985. Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility. The 
American Economic Review 75 (3):424-440. 
Kwon, S. Y., C. Y. Lim, and P. M.-S. Tan. 2007. Legal Systems and Earnings Quality: The Role 
of Auditor Industry Specialization. Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory 26 (2):25-
55. 
Lawrence, A., M. Minutti-Meza, and Z. Ping. 2011. Can Big 4 Versus Non-Big 4 Differences in 
Audit-Quality Proxies Be Attributed to Client Characteristics? The Accounting Review 86 
(1):259-286. 
 66 
 
Lee, P. M., and S. Wahal. 2004. Grandstanding, Certification and the Underpricing of Venture 
Capital Backed IPOs. Journal of Financial Economics 73 (2):375-407. 
Leland, H. E., and D. H. Pyle. 1977. Informational Asymmetries, Financial Structure, and 
Financial Intermediation. Journal of Finance 32 (2):371. 
Li, C., Y. Xie, and J. Zhou. 2010. National Level, City Level Auditor Industry Specialization and 
Cost of Debt. Accounting Horizons 24 (3):395-417. 
Li, O. Z., Y. Lin, and J. R. Robinson. 2016. The Effect of Capital Gains Taxes on the Initial 
Pricing and Underpricing of IPOs. Journal of Accounting & Economics 61 (2/3):465-485. 
Loughran, T., and J. Ritter. 2004. Why Has Ipo Underpricing Changed over Time? Financial 
Management (Blackwell Publishing Limited) 33 (3):5-37. 
Louis, H. 2005. Acquirers’ Abnormal Returns and the Non-Big 4 Auditor Clientele Effect. 
Journal of Accounting and Economics 40 (1-3):75-99. 
Low, K.-Y. 2004. The Effects of Industry Specialization on Audit Risk Assessments and Audit-
Planning Decisions. Accounting Review 79 (1):201-219. 
Lowry, M. 2003. Why Does Ipo Volume Fluctuate So Much? Journal of Financial Economics 
67 (1):3-40. 
Mayhew, B. W., and M. S. Wilkins. 2003. Audit Firm Industry Specialization as a 
Differentiation Strategy: Evidence from Fees Charged to Firms Going Public. Auditing: A 
Journal of Practice and Theory 22 (2):33-52. 
Minutti-Meza, M. 2013. Does Auditor Industry Specialization Improve Audit Quality? Journal 
of Accounting Research 51 (4):779-817. 
Morrison & Foerster LLP. Frequently Asked Questions Relating to Comfort Letters and Comfort 
Letter Practice 2016 [cited. Available from 
http://www.mofo.com/~/media/Files/PDFs/CM_FAQs/FAQsRelatingtoComfortLetters.p
df. 
Numan, W., and M. Willekens. 2012. An Empirical Test of Spatial Competition in the Audit 
Market. Journal of Accounting & Economics 53 (1/2):450-465. 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers LLP. 2015a. Considering an Ipo? An Insight into the Costs Post-Jobs 
Act: available at: http://www.pwc.com/us/en/deals/assets/ipo-costs-considerations-pwc-
deals.pdf (viewed January 31, 2017). 
———. 2015b. Executing a Successful Ipo: available at: 
http://www.pwc.com/us/en/deals/publications/assets/pwc-executing-successful-ipo.pdf 
(viewed January 30, 2017). 
 67 
 
———. 2015c. Material Weaknesses: Why Disclosing Them before Your Ipo May Make Sense: 
available at: https://www.pwc.com/us/en/deals/publications/assets/pwc-deals-ipo-
material-weakness-disclosure.pdf (viewed January 31, 2017). 
———. 2016a. 2015 Annual Us Capital Markets Watch available at: 
http://www.pwc.com/us/en/deals/capital-markets/assets/capital-markets-watch-annual-
report-final.pdf (viewed January 31, 2017). 
———. 2016b. Ipo Market Watch Q1 2016: available at: 
https://www.pwc.com/m1/en/publications/documents/ipo-market-watch-eng-q1-2016.pdf 
(viewed January 30, 2017). 
Reichelt, K. J., and D. Wang. 2010. National and Office-Specific Measures of Auditor Industry 
Expertise and Effects on Audit Quality. Journal of Accounting Research 48 (3):647-686. 
Ritter, J. R. 1984. Signaling and the Valuation of Unseasoned New Issues: A Comment. Journal 
of Finance 39 (4):1231-1237. 
Robin, A. J., and Z. Hao. 2015. Do Industry-Specialist Auditors Influence Stock Price Crash 
Risk? Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory 34 (3):47-79. 
Rock, K. 1986. Why New Issues Are Underpriced. Journal of Financial Economics 15 (1-
2):187-212. 
Ross, S. A. 1977. The Capital Asset Pricing Model (Capm), Short-Sale Restrictions and Related 
Issues. Journal of Finance 32 (1):177-183. 
RSM US LLP. 2015a. Rsm Helps Biopharmaceutical Company Save Ipo Price: available at: 
http://rsmus.com/pdf_download/cs_fas_biopharmaceutical_company.pdf (viewed 
January 31, 2017). 
———. 2015b. Successful Ipo Execution Requires a Multidisciplined Approach: available at: 
http://rsmus.com/pdf_download/cs_re_ipo_readiness.pdf (viewed January 31, 2017). 
Ruder, D. S. Prepared Remarks of Chairman of United States Securities and Exchange 
Commission David S. Ruder  1988 [cited. Available from 
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/1988/031088ruder.pdf. 
The Securities Act of 1933. May 27, 1933, ch. 38, title I, Sec. 1, 48 Stat.74. as amended through 
P.L. 112-106, approved April 5, 2012. 
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934. June 6, 1934,ch. 404, title I, Sec. 1, 48 Stat. 881. as 
amended through P.L. 112-158, approved August 10, 2012. 
Shipman, J. E., Q. T. Swanquist, and R. L. Whited. 2017. Propensity Score Matching in 
Accounting Research. The Accounting Review 92 (1):213-244. 
 68 
 
Simunic, D. A. 1980. The Pricing of Audit Services - Theory and Evidence. Journal of 
Accounting Research 18 (1):161-190. 
Simunic, D. A., and M. T. Stein. 1987. Product Differentiation in Auditing: Auditor Choice in 
the Market for Unseasoned New Issues. the Canadian Certified General Accountants 
Research Foundation. 
Teoh, S. H., T. J. Wong, and G. R. Rao. 1998. Are Accruals During Initial Public Offerings 
Opportunistic? Review of Accounting Studies 3 (1/2):175-208. 
Treasury. Advisory Committee on the Auditing Profession  2008 [cited. Available from 
https://www.treasury.gov/about/organizational-structure/offices/Documents/final-
report.pdf. 
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. Topic 14: Share-Based Payment, March 14, 2011 
2011 [cited January 30, 2017. Available from 
https://www.sec.gov/interps/account/sabcodet14.htm (viewed January 30, 2017). 
———. 2016. 17 Cfr 210 - Form and Content of and Requirements for Financial Statements, 
Securities Act of 1933, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Investment Company Act of 
1940, Investment Advisers Act of 1940, and Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975 
- Regulation S-X. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office database (FDsys) - 
Electronic Code of Federal Regulations - updated June 28, 2016. 
Venkataraman, R., J. P. Weber, and M. Willenborg. 2008. Litigation Risk,Audit Quality, and 
Audit Fees: Evidence from Initial Public Offerings. The Accounting Review 83 (5):1315-
1345. 
Weber, J., and M. Willenborg. 2003. Do Expert Informational Intermediaries Add Value? 
Evidence from Auditors in Microcap IPOs. Journal of Accounting Research 41 (4):681-
720. 
 
 69 
 
APPENDIX  
Variable Definitions 
Variable Definition 
LNAFEES the natural log of a firm’s annual audit fees which consist in all fees 
necessary to perform the audit or review in accordance with GAAS. 
This category also may include services that generally only the 
independent accountant reasonably can provide, such as comfort 
letters, statutory audits, attest services, consents and assistance with 
and review of documents filed with the SEC; 
IPOSPEC an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if an auditor is an IPO 
specialist auditor, and 0 otherwise; 
INDUSTRYSPEC 
(National level) 
1 if auditors have the largest annual market share in a given industry 
at the U.S. national level (the entire audit analytics sample) and have 
more than 10% greater market share than the closest competitor, and 
0 otherwise. 
1 if auditors that have the largest annual market share in a given 
industry at the U.S. city level (the entire audit analytics sample) , 
where city is defined as a Metropolitan Statistical Area following the 
2005U.S. Census Bureau MSA definitions, and have more than 10% 
greater market share than the closest competitor, and 0 otherwise.  
INDUSTRYSPEC 
(City level) 
EGC an indicator variable which take the value one if the client is an 
emerging growth company whose annual revenues are less than $1 
billion, and zero otherwise; 
SIZE the natural log of a client’s total assets (AT); 
LNSALES the natural log of total sales (SALE); 
SEGBUS the natural log of the number of unique business segments; 
SEGGEO the natural log of the number of unique geographical segments in a 
ﬁrm; 
INVAR sum of inventory (INVT)and receivables (RECT) scaled by assets 
(AT); 
FOREIGN foreign pre-tax income (PIFO) divided by pre-tax income (PI) which 
is set to zero if there is no revenue from foreign operation; 
CATA the ratio of current assets (ACT) to total assets (AT); 
QUICK the ratio of current assets (less inventories ACT-INVT) to current 
liabilities(LCT); 
ROA net income before extraordinary items (IB) divided by lagged total 
assets(AT); 
LEV total long-term debt (DLTT) scaled by average total assets; 
LOSS 1 if net income (NI) is negative, and otherwise 0; 
ICW 1 if the client firm has internal control weaknesses in year t-1, and 0 
otherwise; 
GCONCERN 1 if the auditor gave a going-concern opinion to a client in the fiscal 
year, and 0 otherwise; 
NONDEC 1 if the client’s fiscal year-end is not December 31st, and 0 otherwise; 
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Appendix-Continued 
Variable Definition 
BIG4 1 if a clients’ auditor is one of the Big 4 auditors, and 0 otherwise. At 
the beginning of my sample time period (i.e. January 1, 2002), Arthur 
Andersen still existed and the Big 4 at that time was the Big 5; 
SECTIER 1 if a client’s auditor is either BDO Seidman LLP or Grant Thornton 
LLP, 0 otherwise; 
LIT is an indicator variable which takes the value one if the company 
operates in a high litigation industry (SIC codes of 2833–2836, 3570–
3577, 3600–3674, 5200–5961,and 7370–7374), and zero otherwise; 
LNPROCEEDS the natural log of IPO client’s proceeds; 
ATURN total sales (SALE) divided by lagged assets (AT); 
ROALOSS one if ROA is less than zero, and zero otherwise; 
VC an indicator variable which equals 1 if the IPO is backed by venture 
capital, and otherwise 0; 
PRESTIGE an indicator variable which takes 1 if the underwriter for the IPO has 
a modified Carter Manaster Rank of 9.1 (Carter and Manaster 1990; 
Loughran and Ritter 2004; Ertimur et al. 2014) and 0 otherwise; 
O_SCORE -1.32-0.407(Log of Total Assets (AT)) +6.03(Total Liabilities 
(LT)/Total Assets (AT))-1.43(Working Capital (ACT-LCT) /Total 
Assets (AT))-0.076(Current Liabilities (LCT) /Current Assets 
(ACT))-1.72(1 if Total Liabilities (LT) > Total Assets (AT), and 0 
otherwise)-0.521(Net Income(t)-Net Income(t-1))/(|Net Income(t) |-
|Net Income(t-1) |); 
UNDERPRICING the difference between first-day closing price and offer price divided 
by offer price; 
RANK the reputation of underwriters using the updated Carter-Manaster 
ranking (Carter and Manaster,1990) available on Jay Ritter’s website; 
REVISION the percentage price revision from midpoint of initial filing range to 
the offer price; 
SPREAD underwriters’ fees calculated as the total underwriting/ management/ 
selling fees as a percentage of the amount offered in the IPO; 
TECH an indicator variable that equals one for technology firms defined 
using the four-digit SIC codes in Cliff and Denis(2004); 
VWTOT the sum of the value weighted market return for the two months prior 
to the IPO; 
IPORET the average IPO first-day return during the two months prior to a 
firm’s IPO month available on Jay Ritter’s website; 
IPOTOT the total number of IPOs over the two months prior to a firm’s IPO 
month available on Jay Ritter’s website; 
LNAGE the natural log of IPO firm Age defined as the year of the IPO minus 
the year of founding available on Jay Ritter’s website; 
PROCEEDS the log of IPO proceeds in millions, divided by CPI. 
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